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The legally non-binding nature of the EU’s Open Method of Coordination (OMC) has 
sparked a lively scholarly debate that includes, amongst other things, research about its 
function and effectiveness in conjunction with hard law and the integration capacity created 
by different governance structures (hybridity). This paper contributes to this debate via an 
analysis of EU integration within the field of Youth Policy. Contrary to existing research that 
examines hybrid structures in which the OMC interacts with hard law, EU Youth Policy has 
developed a hybrid structure in which the OMC mainly interacts with soft law. Our 
conclusion is that the developed hybrid structure has resulted in an incremental and coherent 
EU Youth Policy in which the OMC plays a crucial role. 
 






As a legally non-binding mode of new governance, the EU’s open method of coordination 
(OMC) has sparked a lively scholarly debate with respect to its functioning as a European 
integration instrument1 and its effectiveness in creating policy change within the Member 
States.2 Current approaches to analysing the OMC usually examined it in isolation of other 
EU governance tools, however, “the OMC is one among a panoply of different 
instruments3”to govern an EU policy field. In response, the theory of hybridity acknowledges 
the co-existence and engagement of hard law and new modes of governance (particularly the 
OMC) and explores their interaction.  
Despite this theoretical acknowledgement, existing studies have two limitations: first, only a 
few empirical case studies have been conducted in exploring the theory of hybridity; and 
second, such studies are limited to the interaction of new governance (the OMC) with hard 
law.4 The latter is particularly significant given that EU policy fields are governed by a wide 
range of instruments including hard law (regulations and directives), new governance (OMC) 
and traditional soft law (e.g. action programmes, recommendations and resolutions). 
Consequently the current theory of hybridity and its empirical case studies provide a narrow 
understanding of EU governance and the interaction of its various components. The focus on 
hard law, the OMC, and their interaction, constructs a dichotomy in which the OMC and 
thereby all EU soft law is considered to be relatively weak. However, this may turn out to be 
different, when the interaction between all these instruments (hard law, the OMC and soft 
law) is taken into account. In particular, this may be the case in policy areas in which there is 
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little or no governance via hard law and mainly governance via the OMC and traditional soft 
law. 
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to examine the function of the OMC as an integration 
instrument by its interaction with the broad range of EU governance instruments, including 
hard law and soft law. For this we focus on the field of EU Youth Policy – a policy field 
which is identified, in part, as being governed by the OMC.5 EU Youth Policy is particularly 
interesting because it is one of the seven flagship initiatives within Europe 2020 Strategy.  
This paper is structured as follows: the first section explains the theory of hybridity. In 
comparison to the existing theory, we argue that it is possible to conceive hybridity much 
more broadly to include a wider range of EU integration instruments. Sections two and three 
concern the case study of the paper - EU Youth Policy - to demonstrate the hybridity of the 
OMC with hard law and more significantly soft law. Section two historically analyses the 
development of EU Youth Policy, while Section three provides an inventory and an analysis 
of the integration instruments utilised to govern EU Youth Policy. From these two sections 
we are able to determine how the instruments have interacted over time within the policy 
field. The final section reflects on what the hybrid structure within EU Youth Policy implies 
for the integration capacity of the OMC in this particular field. Integration capacity in this 
context is understood as being able to influence Member States’ domestic policies. In this 
paper this is measured by the positive and negative incentives that are created by the use of 
the OMC as the main driver to further EU integration within EU Youth Policy.  
 
1. Hybridity and methodology 
 
Gap-thesis and theory of hybrid structures 
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As a new governance instrument, the OMC has been conceptualised in terms of the gap-
thesis, which provides an explanation for the development of patterns of new governance. It 
argues that formal mechanisms of regulation are either blind or unable to deal with: the 
changing practice of governance that includes the participation of the affected actors 
(stakeholders); the emphasis on transparency and policy learning; and ongoing evaluations 
and reviews.6 In fact, this blindness not only applies to hard law, but also to traditional EU 
soft law.7 In response, the emergence of new modes of governance is an attempt to address 
some of the failings of traditional modes of governance and can be distinguished from both 
traditional hard and soft law. The EU’s OMC is argued to be archetypical of these new modes 
of governance.  
While the gap-thesis provides an explanation as to why new forms of governance have 
emerged, the theory of hybrid structures aims to provide a better understanding of how these 
forms of new governance coexist and thereby interact in a policy area with mainly traditional 
hard law. In this respect Trubek and Trubek distinguish between three varieties of 
coexistence, i.e. situations in which new governance and hard law operate in the same policy 
domain.8 Thus, when new governance and hard law simultaneously operate towards a 
common objective, but they have not merged together, they are complementary. When newer 
forms of governance are designed to perform the same task as legal regulation and are thought 
to do it better, or there appears to be a necessary choice between the two, they are rivalry. 
They are transformative if a configuration is not only complementary, but also integrates into 
a single system in which the functioning of each element is necessary for the successful 
operation of the other. Furthermore, Trubek and Trubek note that hybrid structures can be 
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consciously designed to get the best policy outcome of new governance and hard law.9 Hybrid 
structures can also gradually grow into a complementary structure or merge into a new 
constellation. Sometimes this is done intentionally to displace older forms of governance, but 
it can also occur unintentionally as new governance patterns make it hard to deploy existing 
modes of governance. In this particular constellation the new and older forms of governance 
coexist as rivals. Hybrid forms of governance can have important implications for the success 
or failure of a policy area. In this respect, Trubek and Trubek give as examples the successful 
coexistence of new governance (e.g. the OMC) and hard law in the Green Tier Policy of 
Wisconsin and the failed coexistence of the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact.10 
In summary, the theory of hybridity is about how two or more European integration 
governance instruments interact with each other. However, within the current literature there 
has been an emphasis on analysing the interaction between the OMC and hard law, but in 
practice EU policy areas are governed by a variety of instruments, including the OMC, hard 
law and soft law. Secondly, what Trubek and Trubek do not directly address, but which is 
also significant for hybrid structures, is the overall capacity of a hybrid structure to create 
incentives for Member State engagement and activity. From this perspective, we argue that 
both the integration capacity and the incentives for Member States to engage in a policy area 
are stronger when the governance instruments interact positively, either by complementarity 
or transformation, and are weaker when the governance instruments compete for dominance. 
We therefore argue that to fully capture the integration capacity of a policy field, it is 
necessary to determine the interaction structure of all instruments involved in a policy area. 
Therefore an analysis of a policy area requires this broader scope and the following three 
hybrid structures can be defined:  
complementarity: two or more integration instruments working for common goals 
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rivalry:  two or more integration instruments competing for dominance 
transformation: two or more instruments merge into a new hybrid process 
 
This broadens the scope of the theory to the whole range of EU integration instruments, hence 
it enables the study of the interaction of similar integration instruments - for example, two 
directives, two action programmes or two OMCs. Broadening the theory of hybridity is 
particularly relevant with the increasing tendency within the EU to coordinate governance..11  
 
Methodology of defining hybrid structures 
In this paper we apply the broader theory of hybridity to the field of EU Youth policy. This 
field is interesting since it is identified as a policy that is governed by the OMC and represents 
a policy area that currently has a high silence in the EU. The analysis of the hybrid structure 
of EU Youth Policy is done in two stages: firstly, the historical development of EU Youth 
Policy; and secondly, an analysis of its legal instruments.  
The historical development of EU Youth Policy unpacks the current policy mix within the 
EU. The historical analysis is indicative of how the governance framework has evolved, but it 
does not provide an overview of the actual instruments – which create the incentives – 
involved within EU Youth Policy. In the second stage of our analysis we identify the 
instruments operationalised within EU Youth Policy. Since we are concerned with EU 
integration instruments, we selected only those instruments that address the Member States 
directly. Therefore, the opinions of the European Parliament, the Green and White Papers of 
the Commission and the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council were all excluded.  
The identified instruments are ordered by the type of instrument (directive, action programme, 
resolution, OMC, etc.), analysed for the policy action they address, and put into chronological 
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order. Such an overview is necessary to identify which instruments are currently involved 
with EU Youth Policy and therefore need to be analysed on the hybrid structure they create, 
which is the subject of the final section of the paper. To identify the type of hybrid structure 
that is created we analyse how the instruments interact with each other, with in the centre the 
OMC, since we’re interested in the function of this instrument in particular.  
Finally, an analysis is made of the incentives created by the instruments used to govern the 
area of youth. In general there are two ways by which the Member States are encouraged to 
take EU measures into account when developing their own policies: either by positive 
incentives or by compliance mechanisms. As for the positive incentives we identify three 
mechanisms: partial or full financial support; procedural or practical support of the EU; and 
support in learning or broadening knowledge. With respect to compliance we identify three 
mechanisms: the submission of progress or implementation reports by the Member States to 
the Commission; evaluation by the Commission; and judicial review by the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ). 
Depending on the type of hybrid structure created by the framework resolution, these ways of 
influencing Member States either weaken each other (when rivalry) or strengthen each other 
(when complementary or merged by transformative hybridity).  
 
2. Historical development of EU youth policy 
When tracing the subject of youth in EU treaties, we find the first official reference in the 
1957 EEC-Treaty. Article 50 of this treaty provides that: Member States shall, within the 
framework of a joint programme, encourage the exchange of young workers. With the Treaty 
of Maastricht12 this provision was complemented with Article 126 TEC, which deals with 
youth and education and the participation of young people in democratic life in Europe. 
                                               




Although this seems to cover a broad scope, the competence to deal with the subject is limited 
to the encouraging of the cooperation between the Member States and, if necessary, by 
supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the 
Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their 
cultural and linguistic diversity. More specifically within both provisions the competence is 
limited to supportive and supplementary measures.13 Thus, although the personal scope of the 
EU institutions with respect to young persons became wider – from young workers only to 
youth in general – the material scope became smaller – education – and the competence to 
deal with this became weaker since article 126 TEC gives the EU institutions no formal law-
making powers.14 This has remained unchanged during the revisions of Amsterdam15 (article 
149 TEC); Nice16 (article 149 TEC); and Lisbon17 (article 165 TFEU). 
 
It is in this formal context that EU Youth Policy developed during the 1990s when it gained 
political momentum at the transnational level. This began with the Commission’s White 
Paper entitled Growth, Competitiveness and Employment which drew attention to the issue of 
                                               
13 See Article 6 (education, vocational training, youth and sport) TFEU. Since Article 47 TFEU stipulates that 
the Member States shall, within a framework of a joint programme, encourage the exchange of young workers, 
the competence in this context is also limited to supportive and supplementary measures, rather than a shared 
competence as is more general within the provisions of the Internal Market. 
14 B Lange and N Alexiadou, ‘New Forms of European Union Governance in the Education Sector? A 
Preliminary Analysis of the Open Method of Coordination’ (2007) 6(4) European Educational Research Journal, 
321  
15 Treaty of Amsterdam, Amending the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts [1997] OJ L-2985 
16 Treaty of Nice, Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities and Certain Related Acts [2001] OJ C 80/01 
17 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 




unemployment, including the issue of youth unemployment.18 In the Commission’s 1994 
White Paper ‘European Social Policy’, it was noted that ‘EU-wide youth unemployment 
stands at over 20%, as against 13% in the US and 5% in Japan’.19 In response, the White 
Paper proposed a number of initiatives relating to the youth employment, and training and 
education – such as a Union wide guarantee that no one under the age of 18 can be 
unemployed, the elimination of basic illiteracy for school leavers, and the improvement of 
education, training and vocational training.20 While many of these initiatives had already been 
addressed in action programmes and Council resolutions (see next section), they were first 
coherently brought together within the two White Papers. Moreover, by bringing these 
initiatives together, the White Papers were able to make a significant difference in that they 
shifted the narrative of EU employment and social policy from one which concerned workers 
and the establishment and protection of their rights, to one in which unemployment and the 
increase of employment were to be the focus of attention.21 A shift that became tangible with 
the introduction of the European Employment Strategy (EES) in the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
Although not mentioned in the Treaty itself, the employment guidelines make it clear that the 
strategy also concerns youth policies.22 In order to reduce youth unemployment, Member 
States are required to develop employment friendly strategies with the overall aim of ensuring 
‘every unemployed young person is [to be offered] a new start before reaching six months of 
unemployment, in the form of training, retraining, work practice, a job or other employability 
                                               
18 European Commission (1993) White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, Employment: The Challenges and 
Ways Forward in the 21st Century. Com (93) 700 Final. 
19 European Commission (1994) European Social Policy – A Way Forward for the Union: A White Paper. Com 
(94) 333 final. 
20 Commission, ‘EU youth report. An EU strategy for youth – Investing and empowering. Commission staff 
working document accompanying the Communication’ SEC (2009) 549 final, 17 
21 S Velluti, New Governance and the European Employment Strategy (Routledge 2010). 





measure’.23 Member States are also required to ease the transition from school to work, 
particularly for young people from poor backgrounds. As such, they are required to improve 
the quality of their education systems, and where appropriate, develop apprenticeship training. 
The inclusion of youth in the EES appears to be the beginning of a significant policy activism 
within the field of Youth Policy and its mainstreaming into other existing policies, among 
which are participation policies and social inclusion. Moreover, it denotes the emergence of a 
genuine EU Youth Policy that was broad in scope. For instance, on 8 February 1999 the 
European Council and the Ministers responsible for Youth adopted a resolution on youth 
participation that emphasised the importance of young people taking an active part in social, 
political, cultural and economic life.24 Whilst on 23 November 1999 the Youth Council 
established guidelines including a cross-sectorial approach to youth questions and a policy 
based on involving young people. These were to underpin policy cooperation regarding youth 
and were supported by the European Council’s Lisbon Strategy of March 2000 and the 
Laeken Declaration of December 2001. While the former offers a wider context for Youth 
policy, namely that of employment and social inclusion, both including education, the latter 
broadens the policy context by emphasising participation issues, the needs to increase 
employment and combat social exclusion across the EU, and the fostering of economic and 
social cohesion.  
It is within this context that in 2001 a further step was taken towards developing an all-
encompassing EU Youth Policy with the publication of the EU Commission’s White Paper ‘A 
New Impetus for European Youth’.25 The White Paper proposed the appointment of a national 
coordinator from each Member State as a Commission representative for youth-related issues. 
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24 European Council (1999) Resolution on Youth Participation. OJ/1999/C42/1 





It outlined four priority areas: first, the introduction of new ways of enabling young people to 
participate in public life; second, the improvement of information on European issues for the 
young; third, to encourage voluntary service; and fourth, to increase the knowledge of youth-
related issues. The White Paper also proposed to take the youth dimension into account much 
more thoroughly when developing other relevant policies, such as education and training, 
employment and social inclusion, health and anti-discrimination.26 On the basis of the four 
priority areas outlined in the White Paper, the Council established a framework for European 
co-operation in the field of youth.27  
As a follow up to its 2001 White Paper, in October 2004 the Commission issued a 
Communication.28 The Communication served as a stocktaking exercise of the achievements 
of the framework at both the EU and the Member State levels. It demonstrates the 
considerable policy activism that had been achieved to date in the area of Youth Policy and its 
mainstreaming throughout the EU, particularly in other OMCs such as the EES, Education, 
and social inclusion. Indeed the Communication argues that Youth Policy is governed by its 
own OMC, but that such an OMC is different because unlike other policy areas, the objectives 
remain qualitative and their implementation is not the subject of national plans of action 
coordinated at the European Level.29 To provide greater coherence and consistency to the 
various initiatives in the field of Youth Policy, the Council adopted the European Youth Pact 
in March 2005 as part of the revised Lisbon Strategy.30 The pact focussed on three areas: 
                                               
26 ibid 18-21 
27 Resolution of the Council and of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within 
the Council of 27 June 2002 regarding the framework of European cooperation in the youth field [2002] OJ 
C168/2 
28 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council: Follow-up to the White Paper on a New Impetus for 
European Youth: Evaluation of Activities Conducted in the Framework of Cooperation in the Youth Field’ Com 
(2004) 694. 
29 ibid 7 




employment integration and social advancement; education, training and mobility; and the 
reconciliation of work and family life. The aims of the European Youth Pact were to be 
pursued within the EU’s Lisbon Strategy and focus on the three previously mentioned OMCs. 
In this respect, the area of Youth Policy provides a good example of the practice of 
mainstreaming within the EU and the OMC mode of governance. 
 
In response to the EU’s New Social Agenda launched in 2008, launched the Commission in 
April 2009 its Communication ‘Youth – Investing and Empowering’.31 The Communication 
represents one of the most detailed analyses of the current situation of young people across 
the EU and, for the period 2010-2018, invited both the Member States and the Commission to 
cooperate in field of youth by means of a renewed OMC. It proposed a cross-sectorial 
approach with both short and long term objectives, involving all key policy areas that affect 
the EU’s young people. The Communication also invited all Member States to organise a 
permanent and regular dialogue (structured dialogue) with young people. Furthermore, via its 
Communication the Commission also encouraged a more research and evidence-based youth 
policy. Following the Communication, the Council adopted the 2009 resolution on a renewed 
framework for European cooperation in the youth field (2010-2018).32 The resolution defines 
one overarching objective, namely ‘to enable all young women and men to make the best of 
their potential’ to be achieved via two sub-objectives: 1) more and equal opportunities for 
young people in education and in the labour market; and 2) active citizenship, social inclusion 
and solidarity of young people. The objectives are underpinned by eight fields of action in 
which initiatives should be undertaken: education and training; employment and 
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32 European Council (2009) Council Resolution on a renewed framework for European cooperation in the youth 




entrepreneurship; health and well being; participation; voluntary activities; social inclusion; 
youth and the world; and creativity and culture. 
In addition to the 2009 Framework Resolution, the issue of youth is also part of Europe 2020, 
the vehicle taking forward the EU’s policy commitments over the next decade. In Europe 
2020 the area of youth is not only incorporated into the integrated policy guidelines that 
concern employment, education, training and skills, and social inclusion/poverty,33 but it 
forms one of the flagship initiatives. The five flagship initiatives are jointly undertaken by EU 
and national actors and are steered by the European Commission - in the area of Youth the 
initiative is called ‘Youth on the Move’. The focus of this initiative is to increase the chances 
of young people in finding a job by enhancing student and trainee mobility and improving the 
quality and attractiveness of education and training in Europe.34 Since this matches several of 
the action fields of 2009 Framework Resolution (Education, employment and participation), it 
has essentially been incorporated into this wider structure and as such, further strengthens the 
political competence of 2009 Framework Resolution. Furthermore, with young people being 
one of the worst affected by the economic crisis, political support for the EU to step up in this 
policy field continues. This is illustrated by the recent initiatives such as Youth on the Move 
and the Youth employment Package (including the Youth Guarantee), which are both part of 
wider EU strategies (Europe 2020 and the EES respectively) and are incorporated in the EU 
Youth Strategy.35 
In summary it can be said that the legal competence, i.e. the basis in the EU treaty for the 
development of an overall EU Youth Policy is small and limited. However, its political 
                                               
33 European Council, Council Decision of 21 October 2010 on guidelines for the Employment policies of the 
Member States. (OJ [2010] L 308/46). 
34 European Commission Initiative Youth on the Move: An initiative to unleash the potential of young people to 
achieve smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in the European Union. [2010] (Comm 2010/477 final).  
35European Commission Communication [2013a] COM/2013/477/final and European Commission Initiative 




competence is strong since it grasps momenta created in other EU policy fields and broader 
EU strategies, such as the EES, the Lisbon Strategy, the Laeken Declaration, the 2008 New 
Social Policy Agenda, and Europe 2020. Each of these addresses issues (employment, social 
inclusion, education and participation) that form the main drivers of the 2009 Framework 
Resolution. 
 
3. Inventory of EU Youth Policy acquis 
The above section makes clear that the 2009 Framework Resolution forms the core 
component of the EU’s Youth Policy. Therefore we take this framework resolution as a 
starting point to identify the instruments that form the acquis Communautaire of EU Youth 
Policy. In total we identified 101 instruments (overview is available on request) that were 
adopted between 1961 and 2010. Such instruments include directives, action programmes, 
resolutions and OMCs (see figure 1). There is a relatively small group of instruments 
indicated with “other”. This group contains instruments such as Council Conclusions, 
declarations, the decisions and regulations dealing with the European Social Fund and the two 
EU charters concerning fundamental rights (1989 for workers and 2000 for the EU).  
Figure 1 provides an overview of the number and type of instruments in EU Youth Policy 
adopted for the period of analysis (1960s to 2010).36 Figure 2 gives an overview of EU Youth 
Policy activism in the eight fields of action of the 2009 Framework Resolution. The number 
of actions in this field is higher than the number of instruments in figure 1. The deviation is a 
result of some instruments addressing more than one action policy and this is particularly the 
case of those instruments adopted during the last period of analysis (2000-2010). Together, 
                                               
36 The inventory also includes instruments from the period after 2010, however, since we decided to present the 
development in periods of ten years, the inclusion of this data in the figures is decisive in the sense that it only 
includes three years. In these three years, nine instruments have been adopted which continue the line of 




figures 1 and 2 reveal several traits within the field of EU Youth Policy. Generally speaking, 
over time, EU policy activism has increased, but most of that increase (approximately 50 per 
cent) occurred during the last period, 2000-2010. This increase resembles the political 
momentum EU Youth Policy gained during the second half of the 1990s and its consolidation 
in the renewed framework for 2010-2018. Furthermore, with the exception of two directives, 
figure 1 reveals that the acquis Communautaire of Youth Policy is comprised of legally non-
binding measures. The two directives are both adopted in the action field ‘health & well-
being’ and concern health and safety at work – a social policy area that is predominantly 
governed by EU hard law.37 Looking more closely at the typology of EU instruments used in 
EU Youth Policy, we can see that over time, the variety of instruments increases from two in 
the 1960s (action programmes and a commission recommendation) to five in the 1990s,38 and 
finally to a more representative variety of four instruments between 2001-2010.39  
Figure 1 also demonstrates a shift in the typology of instruments used - during the first three 
decades (1961-1990) action programmes are the most popular instruments, while they become 
marginalised during the last period (2001-2010) in favour of Council Resolutions and OMCs.  
 
Figure 1: Number and Type of Instruments in EU Youth Policy Adopted over the Course of Time 
                                               
37 B.P. ter Haar and P. Copeland, What are the future prospects of the European Social Model? An analysis of 
EU Equal Opportunities and Employment Policy (2010) 16 (3) European Law Journal 273-291 
38 This is due to the adoption of one of the two exceptional directives. 
39 This variety would be more when the category ‘other’ would be subdivided in specific instruments, however, 
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Figure 2 confirms the increase in EU Youth Policy activism in the last period (2000-2010), 
yet, it shows a significant difference in the intensity of policy activism. The action fields 
‘youth and the world’ and ‘creativity & culture’ lag considerably behind the other fields. 
Despite twice as much activity in the action fields ‘health & well-being’ and ‘voluntary 
activities’, these two fields still demonstrate a relatively moderate level of activism compared 
to the action fields ‘social inclusion’, ‘participation’, ‘education & training’ and ‘employment 
& entrepreneurship’. Only in the latter two action fields the EU has always been considerably 
active. The first one even demonstrates a remarkable upsurge of activism during the 1980s. 
This upsurge can be contributed to the successive action programmes (called: Petra) that 
concerned the preparation of young people for work and their transition from education to 
working life that started in 1976 and gained momentum in the 1980s when (youth) 
unemployment increased across the Member States.40 The last Petra programme was adopted 
in 1991, after which its main objective - having education and vocational training better 
attuned to the skills and needs of the labour market – was incorporated into the employment 
strategy. 
                                               
40 Mixed Resolution concerning measures to be taken to improve the preparation of young people for work and 
to facilitate their transition from education to working life PETRA (OJ [1976] C308/1); Mixed Resolution 
concerning measures to be taken to improve the preparation of young people for work and to facilitate their 
transition from education to working life PETRA (OJ [1980] C23/1); Mixed Resolution concerning measures to 
be taken to improve the preparation of young people for work and to facilitate their transition from education to 
working life PETRA (OJ [1982] C193/1); Mixed Resolution extending for one year certain measures to be taken 
to improve the preparation of young people for work and to facilitate their transition from education to working 
life PETRA (OJ [1985] C328/3); 87/569/EEC: Council Decision concerning an action programme for the 
vocational training of young people and their preparation for adult and working life PETRA (OJ [1987] 
L346/31); Mixed Conclusion on the second European Community action programme (1982 to 1987) concerning 
the transition of young people from education to adult and working life PETRA (OJ [1988] C177/1); and 
91/387/EEC: Council Decision amending Decision 87/569/EEC concerning an action programme for the 





With respect to the action field of social inclusion, it is worth noting that the EU has been 
active in this field since the 1970s. Such EU programmes rarely single out target groups, 
unless it is clear that a group is threatened by poverty or exclusion, such as migrants or 
children of families already living in poverty. Although young people are not named as a 
specific target group, the actions of the Member States targeting young people are supported 
by the EU poverty programme. As such, these programmes indirectly support youth policy 
and are an important aspect of EU Youth Policy. However, we have only found evidence of 
such in relation to one programme41 and therefore confined the inventory to this programme 
only. Hence, it is only during the last period (2000-2010) that the policy field of combating 
social exclusion becomes tangible to the EU policy agenda. This development can be 
attributed to the Treaty of Nice42 which clarified the competence of the EU in the field, and 
the Lisbon Strategy which, as described above, included a social (cohesion) dimension in its 
new EU strategy for 2010. Consequently, the action field ‘social inclusion’ becomes more 
visible in EU Youth Policy and vice versa, resulting in a better streamlining of the problems 
of young people in social inclusion policies. 
The strong increase of policy activism during the last period (2000-2010) in the action fields 
‘education & vocational training’ and ‘employment & entrepreneurship’ can also be attributed 
to the Lisbon Strategy, as well as its re-launch in 2005 and its continuation in Europe 2020. 
Although both action fields have often been addressed together in the field of youth, this is 
even more so after 2000. A closer inspection reveals that of the nineteen activities in the 
action field ‘employment & entrepreneurship’, two activities exclusively deal with this action 
field, while ten activities also include education, and seven include other action fields, among 
which four social inclusion.  
                                               
41 Council Decision concerning a programme of pilot schemes and studies to combat poverty [1975] OJ L199/34. 




Although the development of the action field ‘participation’ appears to keep pace with 
‘education & vocational training’ and ‘employment & entrepreneurship’ in terms of policy 
activism, in fact it follows its own path of political development: EU citizenship. The 1999 
resolution on youth participation makes such clear as it encourages ‘to enable young people to 
participate in all aspects of active citizenship, including their political participation and their 
mobility within the European Union, thereby involving young citizens in the process of 
further European integration’).43 This action field serves two purposes: 1) to promote active 
participation of young people in societal matters; and while doing so 2) stimulate the 
inclusion of young people who are (threatened) by exclusion. As such, this action policy 
works both ways: it enhances active citizenship and reduces youth social exclusion.44 
Moreover, it is therefore no coincident that these two action fields keep pace with each other 
in the 1990s.  
Finally, what stands out in both figures is that over the course of time the difference between 
the number of instruments adopted in the periods deviates substantially from the number of 
action fields addressed in that same period. Thus while this relates in the period 1961-1970 as 
3:4, it is 10:12 in the period 1971-1980, 16:22 in the period 1981-1990, 22:30 in the period 
1991-2000, and 45:80 in the period 2001-2010. As discussed in section 2, the increase in 
activism and policy actions not only signifies the movement towards a genuine EU Youth 
Policy, it also indicates a growing coherence between the different fields of action. This can 
be deduced from the number of instruments that deal with actions on education, employment, 
participation and social inclusion, either by dealing with all four issues within one instrument, 
or a combination of instruments. In the final section we further examine the effect of this 
coherence in policy actions with respect to the incentives they create for action within the 
Member States.  
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4. The Hybrid structure of EU Youth Policy 
From the above it is argued that in contrast to the earlier piecemeal approach to the policy 
field, from the second half of the 1990s there exists more coherence between the eight action 
fields, as illustrated in figure 2. An example of such coherence can be found in the 2004 
Mixed Resolution on social integration with respect to young people that calls for the Member 
States: ‘to take particular account of the measures appropriate in a social integration context 
to young people’ and states that ‘it is desirable that there be more coherence, coordination and 
cooperation in the formulation of policies of a social nature, with particular regard to the 
youth sector’.45 Policies addressed in this resolution include education, mobility, employment, 
and social integration. Furthermore the resolution provides a non-exhaustive list of twelve 
measures to be considered by the Member States, involving the action fields social inclusion 
(measures i, ix, x, and xii), participation (measures ii and vii), education (measures iii, v, vi 
and xi), and employment (measure iv), whereas measure viii addresses all four of the action 
fields. Another example is the ‘Youth in Action’ programme (2007-2013)46 that replaces 
several separate programmes in the field of education, the programmes to encourage the 
exchange of young workers, and the ‘youth for Europe’ programmes. Furthermore, it 
emphasises in Article 11 its complementarity with ‘other areas of Community action’, among 
which education, employment, health, and social inclusion.47 The 2006 action programme 
‘Progress’ is yet another example of the growing coherence since it underpins the EES and 
the OMC on social inclusion and stresses its consistency and complementarity “with other 
                                               
45 European Council Resolution and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting 
within the Council, on social integration with regard to young people [2004] (doc. 9601/04 of 18 May 2004). 
46 European Council Decision Establishing the Youth in Action Programme for the period 2007-2013[2006a]   
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Union and Community policies, instruments and actions”, among which education, training 
and youth.48 
As these examples demonstrate, the interaction between the action fields is more than just 
coherence. In this respect we conclude that from 2000 onwards, a hybrid structure of 
complementarity is created. The 2002 mixed resolution regarding the framework of European 
cooperation in the youth field is another example of such complementarity: it refers and 
builds on previous EU initiatives and promotes an integrated approach between these action 
fields. Moreover, by the explicit acknowledgement that instead of having independent policy 
fields, Youth Policy should be complementary to other policy fields, we argue that this 
resolution is the first step towards transformative hybridity.49 This means that certain thematic 
priorities of the specific youth field – participation; information; voluntary activities; and 
greater understanding and knowledge of youth – are to be governed by the OMC, and that the 
youth dimension should be taken into account in other policies as well, including education, 
lifelong learning, mobility, employment and social integration, combating racism and 
xenophobia, and autonomy.  
With the interlude of the 2005 European Youth Pact, the 2009 renewed framework resolution 
for European cooperation in the youth field finalises the merging into one single new hybrid 
process. This merging consolidates the dual approach of the 2002 framework involving the 
development of EU Youth Policies by specific initiatives and the promotion of youth issues 
by mainstreaming them into other fields. Also, the renewed framework is more 
comprehensive than the 2002 framework and 2005 Youth Pact, since it includes all eight 
fields of action and it takes stock of all activities that already have been undertaken by the 
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EU. We deduce this from several aspects. Firstly, as indicated in section 2, it defines one 
overarching objective (to enable all young women and men to make the best of their 
potential) that is subdivided into two more specific objectives: 1) to create more and equal 
opportunities for all young people in education and the labour market; and 2) to promote the 
active citizenship, social inclusion and solidarity of all young people. With this the framework 
resolution merges the two main developments within the field of EU Youth Policy: that of 
education and employment which gained political momenta with the EES and the Lisbon 
Strategy; with that of participation and social inclusion which gained political momenta with 
the Laeken Declaration and the Lisbon Strategy.  
Furthermore, the 2009 Framework Resolution deliberately and explicitly names the eight 
action fields regarding which a dual approach should be undertaken in order to achieve the 
two interrelated sub-objectives. Firstly, specific initiatives should be undertaken in the youth 
field – i.e. ‘policies and actions specifically targeted at young people in areas such as non-
formal learning, participation, voluntary activities, youth work, mobility and information’.50 
Secondly, initiatives should be mainstreamed – i.e. ‘initiatives to enable a cross-sectoral 
approach where due account is taken of youth issues when formulating, implementing and 
evaluating policies and actions in other policy fields which have significant impact on the 
lives of young people’.51 
In fact, we deduce the aim of the 2009 Framework resolution to merge the action fields and 
policy initiatives in these fields also from the specific and mainstreaming initiatives listed in 
the Annex of the resolution that perfectly match the initiatives that have already been 
undertaken. More particularly, the framework resolution coordinates five different governance 
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techniques supporting all EU Youth action fields: reporting, dissemination and monitoring; 
evidence-based policy-making; structured dialogue; mutual learning; and the mobilisation of 
funds. Youth work is in this context considered as a support to all fields and cross-sectoral 
cooperation is considered as an underlying principle. These governance mechanisms come on 
top of the mechanisms that the individual EU initiatives regarding each specific action field 
create. Our analysis of the acquis Communautaire on Youth shows that this includes the 
following governance mechanisms to stimulate Member States to take EU Youth Policies into 
account:  
- financial support (in particular by the European Social Fund);  
- exchange of good practices,  
- challenged (by peer reviews and benchmarks),  
- persuaded (by progress reports and evaluations, but also  
- by practical support by the Commission), and  
- forced via judicial review (by directives).  
 
As a result of the political strategic merger of the action fields and the individual initiatives 
within these action fields, the various governance mechanisms, those supporting all the fields 
and those of the individual initiatives, have also merged. Hence, since they are applied within 
the same policy field, they work together for the same goals, within the same context and at 
the same time. As such they work to each other’s strengths and together build pressure on the 
Member States to take youth matters into account when developing national laws and policies 
in the various action fields. Within the action field of employment and entrepreneurship for 
instance, eleven policy initiatives cover the field. which are governed by several integration 
instruments that employ different incentives and compliance mechanisms. Among the 




directive. Together these instruments hold a panoply of incentives, including financial support 
(Progress and ESF), support in learning by dissemination of information and practices, and 
practical support by the Commission. They also apply a whole range of compliance 
mechanisms, among which monitoring and evaluations by the Commission, progress reports, 
and judicial review.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This article has focused on the interaction of the EU’s OMC with other integration 
instruments, notably hard law and traditional soft law. Central to this analysis has been to 
further understand the meaning of the OMC as an integration instrument. For this we choose 
the field of EU Youth policy. While there is limited competence for the EU to act in this field, 
the historical analysis has shown that on the political level, the issue has seized its moments 
which has resulted in a coherent programme addressing the issue of Youth from eight 
different policy angles.  
This coherence is also found on the instrumental level in the 2009 framework resolution. 
Significant in this respect is the changing type of integration instruments to operationalise EU 
Youth policy: from mainly action programmes to a wider range of instruments including 
policy guiding resolutions and OMCs. As the regulatory mechanism of the framework 
resolution, the OMC plaid an important role this creating coherence, since it functions as a 
spinal-cord that connects the eight action fields. It does so on two levels: first on policy level 
by addressing the different action fields in relation to each other; and second on instrumental 
level by merging the different instruments used to further the integration of the different 
action fields in order to achieve the two main goals of the resolution. 
The result of the merger of the policy goals and integration instruments is that each action 




influence the activities of the Member States in the area of youth. Moreover, the iterative 
nature of the OMC has created a cycle of three years by which the objectives can be reviewed 
and the action priorities changed (a rolling agenda), enabling the EU Youth Strategy to 
continue its development and incorporate new initiatives within the basic structure. 
Particularly interesting of the example of EU Youth Policy is that it illustrates that the OMC 
not only interacts with EU hard law, such as directives, yet it also interacts with soft law, 
among which action programmes and policy guiding resolutions. Our analysis shows that the 
strength of the OMC lies not so much by its individual governance capacities, instead it lies in 
what it can create in its interaction with other integration instruments (coordination of 
governance). Although this will differ per policy field since it is also highly subjective to the 
political setting, however, what our study of EU Youth Policy illustrates is that when the 
political willingness is there, the EU can undertake a lot, even when the legal possibilities are 
limited. In what it can create depends on the instruments the EU chooses. With the use of 
mainly action programmes (read: financial support), the EU achieved little more than 
piecemeal activities to address the situation of the young. The OMC on the other hand 
functioned as an amplifier merging in itself non-significant soft law integration instruments, 
into a significant coherent programme addressing the situation of young people. Moreover, as 
a result of this merger on policy and instrumental level, a programme was developed that is 
underpinned by a wide variety of stimulus including incentives and pressures for Member 
States to comply with the programme when dealing with the subject on national level.  
More generally, in conclusion, what our study demonstrates is that in policy areas in which 
the EU has a limited competence, overtime OMC-type governance can make a significant 
contribution to both broadening and deepening integration within the field.  
